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Abstract 
 
The National Credit Act 34 of 2005 prohibits the granting of reckless 
credit and also provides for certain remedies that courts can grant 
to consumers who have fallen victim to reckless lending practices. 
Depending on the circumstances, these remedies are the partial or 
full setting aside of the consumer's rights and obligations under the 
agreement; the temporary suspension of the effect of the 
agreement; and the restructuring of the consumer's obligations. This 
article investigates these remedies with a focus on the effect that 
they would have on a credit provider under a mortgage agreement. 
The argument is made that the contractual and security rights of 
credit providers amount to "property" for the purposes of section 
25(1) of the Constitution of the Republic of |South Africa, 1996 (the 
property clause) and that, to some degree or another, each of these 
remedies involves a "deprivation" (limitation or modification) of the 
creditor provider's rights (property). The consequence is that, when 
one of these remedies is granted to a consumer, the court must tailor 
the remedy in such a way that the effect on the credit provider is not 
"arbitrary" as meant in the property clause. Therefore, the proposal 
is that there must be a sufficient relationship between the purpose 
of the remedy (to discourage reckless lending and to rectify the 
damage caused) and the effects thereof on the credit provider. In 
general, the remedy should not go further than is necessary to rectify 
the prejudice suffered by the consumer due to the credit provider's 
conduct. The formulation of the remedy should accommodate 
considerations such as whether and to what extent either or both 
parties have already performed under the agreement, and it should 
accordingly ensure that the consumer will not be unjustifiably 
enriched. The remedy should also account for the effect that it would 
have if the consumer is permitted to keep the property that was 
subject to the reckless credit agreement. The article furthermore 
raises doubts regarding the recent high court judgment in ABSA v 
De Beer 2016 3 SA 432 (GP), where all the consumer's rights and 
obligations under a mortgage agreement were set aside due to the 
credit provider's reckless conduct. Remedies like this have serious 
consequences and therefore it is imperative that courts carefully 
investigate all the effects that the order would have, so that a just 
and reasonable outcome is achieved. This article accordingly aims 
to provide some guidance with reference to the principles of 
constitutional property law. 
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1 Introduction 
One of the aims of the National Credit Act1 is to promote responsibility in 
the credit market by encouraging responsible borrowing and discouraging 
reckless lending.2 When seeking to resolve consumer over-indebtedness 
through debt enforcement or debt restructuring, for instance, the Act also 
places a premium on the satisfaction of all responsible – as opposed to 
irresponsible – financial obligations.3 Therefore, one of the ways in which 
Parliament intended to address the problems surrounding consumer over-
indebtedness in South Africa was by providing ways to prevent people from 
incurring unaffordable debt but also to relieve or "rescue"4 consumers who 
have fallen victim to reckless lending. 
The focus of this article is on the latter, namely the remedies that the NCA 
provides for consumers who have been exposed to what the Act calls 
"reckless credit".5 My focus is also narrowed to mortgage agreements in the 
light of the fact that the high court in ABSA v De Beer6 recently declared a 
mortgage agreement reckless and remedied the situation by setting aside 
all of the consumer's obligations under the agreement.7 Setting aside all the 
obligations under a mortgagee agreement, which is one of the available 
                                            
*  Reghard Brits. BCom (Law) LLB LLD (Stellenbosch) Cert Insolvency Law & Practice 
(Pretoria). Senior Lecturer, Department of Mercantile Law, University of Pretoria. 
Email: reghard.brits@up.ac.za. This article forms the basis of a paper presented at 
the annual South African Property Law Teachers' colloquium, hosted by 
Stellenbosch University on 2-3 November 2017. My gratitude to Corlia van Heerden 
for reading and commenting on this article. All shortcomings are my own. 
1  National Credit Act 34 of 2005 (hereafter NCA). 
2  Section 3(c) of the NCA. 
3  Section 3(g) and (i) of the NCA. 
4  Vessio 2006 THRHR 657. 
5  Sections 80-84 of the NCA. For situations in which these provisions do not apply, 
see ss 78(1)-(2). In general, see Van Heerden "Over-indebtedness and Reckless 
Credit" para 11.5; Otto and Otto National Credit Act Explained 4th ed 89-92; Kelly-
Louw "Consumer Credit" paras 135-137; Kelly-Louw Consumer Credit Regulation 
293-313. Also see Coetzee Comparative Reappraisal 270-282; Kelly-Louw 2014 SA 
Merc LJ 26-45; Brits Mortgage Foreclosure para 4.3.3; Stoop and Kelly-Louw 2011 
PELJ 85-88; Renke 2011 THRHR 223-227; Van Heerden and Boraine 2011 De Jure 
392-415; Boraine and Van Heerden 2010 THRHR 650-656; Stoop 2009 SA Merc LJ 
367-368; Vessio 2009 TSAR 274-289; Kelly-Louw 2008 SA Merc LJ 218-222; 
Renke, Roestoff and Haupt 2007 Obiter 245-247; Vessio 2006 THRHR 649-657. 
6  ABSA Bank Ltd v De Beer 2016 3 SA 432 (GP) (hereafter De Beer). See Van 
Heerden "Over-indebtedness and Reckless Credit" para 11.5.7.1; Koekemoer 2016 
JQR para 2.1. 
7  Similar situations have been reported in the media. See eg SAPA 2010 
http://www.fin24.com/PersonalFinance/Money-Clinic/Absa-guilty-of-reckless-
lending-20100430; and also Kelly-Louw Consumer Credit Regulation 312-313; 
Kelly-Louw 2010 JQR para 2.1; Boraine and Van Heerden 2010 THRHR 651. 
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orders that a court may grant, seems rather drastic,8 and thus it is vital to 
closely analyse the law in this respect. The logical effects of such an order 
include that the property is set free of the mortgage (as a real security right)9 
while the consumer (the owner/mortgagor) is no longer required to pay 
anything towards the loan. One may ask whether this kind of windfall for the 
victim of reckless lending is truly defendable. In reaction to the order that 
was granted in De Beer, authors like Sonnekus10 and Otto11 have expressed 
their concerns as to the extent of the court's powers in this regard. Other 
authors have also pointed to the serious uncertainties that surround these 
remedies in general.12 
During the years that the NCA has been in operation, it has become quite 
common for consumers to make the allegation of reckless lending as one 
of their defences in proceedings instituted by the credit provider to enforce 
the credit agreement. Except for De Beer,13 such defences have rarely been 
successful in both the mortgage14 and non-mortgage15 contexts, although 
                                            
8  See eg Vessio 2006 THRHR 657; Vessio 2009 TSAR 288. 
9  This is a consequence of the principle that the mortgage is accessory to the principal 
obligation – meaning that the security right cannot exist if there is no principal 
obligation. See eg Kilburn v Estate Kilburn 1931 AD 501 505-506; Thienhaus v Metje 
& Ziegler 1965 3 SA 25 (A) 32; and further Brits Real Security 20-25. 
10  Sonnekus 2016 TSAR 351-361. 
11  Otto 2017 TSAR 168-170. 
12  See especially Van Heerden "Over-indebtedness and Reckless Credit" para 11.5.7; 
Van Heerden and Boraine 2011 De Jure 392-415; Boraine and Van Heerden 2010 
THRHR 650-656. 
13  And some matters reported in the media, as indicated in fn 7 above. 
14  See eg Standard Bank of South Africa Ltd v Kelly 2011 ZAWCHC 1 (25 January 
2011) (hereafter Kelly); Mercantile Bank Ltd v Hajat 2013 ZAGPJHC 134 (9 May 
2013); ABSA Bank Ltd v Malherbe 2013 ZAFSHC 78 (16 May 2013); Land & 
Agricultural Development Bank of South Africa Ltd v Bosch 2014 ZAGPJHC 130 (30 
May 2014); ABSA Bank Limited v Pereira 2015 JDR 1208 (GJ); Standard Bank of 
South Africa Limited v Dlamini 2016 ZAGPPHC 26 (22 January 2016); ABSA Bank 
Limited v Kganakga 2016 ZAGPJHC 59 (18 March 2016); Nedbank Limited v 
Schoeman 2016 ZAGPJHC 142 (2 June 2016); Maria v Nedbank Limited; In re: 
Nedbank Limited v Foley 2016 ZAGPPHC 669 (4 August 2016); ABSA Bank Limited 
v Potgieter 2017 ZAECPEHC 8 (31 January 2017); Wiese v ABSA Bank Limited 
2017 ZAWCHC 12 (24 February 2017); FirstRand Bank Limited v Van Coller 2017 
ZAGPPHC 85 (8 March 2017). 
15  See eg SA Taxi Securitisation (Pty) Ltd v Mbatha and Two Similar Cases 2011 1 SA 
310 (GSJ) (hereafter Mbatha); SA Taxi Securitisation (Pty) Ltd v Nako 2010 
ZAECBHC 4 (8 June 2010) (hereafter Nako); SA Taxi Securitisation (Pty) Ltd v Xolile 
2012 JOL 29510 (ECM); SA Taxi Securitisation (Pty) Ltd v Campher 2012 
ZAECGHC 9 (24 February 2012) (hereafter Campher); SA Taxi Development 
Finance (Pty) Ltd v Mokolobe 2013 ZAGPJHC 198 (11 June 2013); Mofuta v SA Taxi 
Securitisation (Pty) Ltd, In re: SA Taxi Securitisation (Pty) Ltd v Mofuta 2013 
ZAFSHC 95 (20 June 2013); SA Taxi Securitisation (Pty) Ltd v Melaphi 2014 
ZAWCHC 47 (2 April 2014); Africa Bank Limited v Greyling 2014 ZAGPJHC 315 (7 
November 2014); Toyota Financial Services South Africa v Mohlabi 2015 ZAFSHC 
178 (10 September 2015) (hereafter Mohlabi). 
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there have been some instances in which an application for summary 
judgment was denied due to the prospect that a reckless credit defence 
might succeed on trial.16 The lack of success in relying on reckless lending 
as a defence is mostly because consumers struggle to prove that the credit 
provider did not do a pre-agreement affordability assessment. Often the 
reckless credit defence is also raised as a last desperate attempt to thwart 
the credit provider's enforcement action, but the courts have little sympathy 
for vague and bold allegations of reckless lending without sufficient 
substantiation.17 
Therefore, the aim of this article is to investigate the effect of the NCA's 
reckless credit remedies, with an emphasis on the mortgage context. It is 
imperative to establish clearer guidelines on how to approach these 
remedies, so that they can be applied in a consistent and principled manner. 
It is also necessary to comply with the overall purpose of the Act, which is 
to strike an equitable balance between the interests of consumers and credit 
providers.18 In this regard, the main proposal of this article is that section 
25(1) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, which prohibits the 
arbitrary deprivation of property, can be a useful tool to help evaluate the 
nature, effects and limits of the reckless credit remedies. I will show that the 
creditor's contractual right to receive payment in accordance with the terms 
of the contract, qualifies as "property" for constitutional purposes, and that 
the various remedies in the reckless credit context have the effect of 
"depriving" the credit provider of such property. Ultimately I will therefore 
argue that the arbitrariness test laid down in section 25(1) provides valuable 
insights into the application of these remedies. A general hypothesis is that 
any remedy given in the reckless credit context should be tailored in a way 
that it does not go further than what is necessary to rectify the prejudice 
caused to the consumer by the credit provider's reckless lending practice. 
Any interference with the credit provider's rights beyond this point is 
constitutionally suspect and should hence be avoided. 
                                            
16  See eg ABSA Bank v Coe Family Trust 2012 3 SA 184 (WCC); Benade v ABSA 
Bank Limited 2014 ZAWCHC 84 (16 May 2014); ABSA Bank Ltd v Schneider 2015 
ZAGPPHC 855 (3 December 2015). 
17  See eg Mbatha para 26; Mohlabi paras 13, 20. 
18  Section 3 of the NCA. 
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2 Statutory framework for reckless credit 
2.1 General 
The NCA prohibits a credit provider from entering into a reckless credit 
agreement with a prospective consumer.19 Therefore, before concluding a 
credit agreement, the credit provider must take reasonable steps to assess 
the proposed consumer's "general understanding and appreciation of the 
risks and costs of the proposed credit, and of the rights and obligations of a 
consumer under a credit agreement"; the consumer's "debt re-payment 
history as a consumer under credit agreements"; and his "existing financial 
means, prospects and obligations".20 The credit provider must furthermore 
assess "whether there is a reasonable basis to conclude that any 
commercial purpose may prove to be successful, if the consumer has such 
a purpose for applying for that credit agreement".21 The Act allows a credit 
provider to determine its own evaluative mechanisms or models and 
procedures when fulfilling its assessment obligations, as long as these are 
fair, objective and not in conflict with any affordability assessment 
regulations.22 
However, the burden is not on the credit provider alone, since the Act 
expects the consumer, when applying for credit and while such an 
application is being considered, to "fully and truthfully answer any requests 
for information made by the credit provider as part of the assessment".23 
Moreover, in the event that an allegation of reckless credit is made, it is as 
a complete defence for the credit provider if it can show that the consumer 
failed to fully and truthfully answer the relevant requests for information, and 
if such failure materially affected the credit provider's ability to make a 
proper assessment.24 
                                            
19  Section 81(3) of the NCA. 
20  Section 81(2)(a)(i)-(iii) of the NCA. 
21  Section 81(2)(b) of the NCA. 
22  Section 82(1) of the NCA. On the affordability assessment regulations, see Renke 
2015 LitNet 432-454. Also see Van Heerden "Over-indebtedness and Reckless 
Credit" para 11.5.6; Van Heerden and Renke 2015 Int Insolv Rev 67-95; Kelly-Louw 
"Consumer Credit" para 135. 
23  S 81(1). 
24  S 81(4)(a)-(b). See Kelly-Louw 2014 SA Merc LJ 47-54; Kelly-Louw Consumer 
Credit Regulation 300-304; Kelly-Louw "Consumer Credit" para 136; Van Heerden 
"Over-indebtedness and Reckless Credit" para 11.5.5. 
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Section 130(4)(a) of the Act determines that if, during any proceedings 
involving debt, a court determines that the credit agreement was reckless,25 
the court "must" make one of the orders in section 83 pertaining to the 
reckless credit remedies.26 This appears to suggest that the court has no 
discretion to deviate from the powers granted in section 83 and that it can 
make no order other than those provided for in that section.27 Yet section 
83 itself appears to incorporate a discretion by stating that the court or 
Tribunal28 "may" declare the agreement reckless.29 In my view this implies 
that, even if all the conditions are met, the court is not obliged to declare the 
agreement reckless.30 As seen below, the possible orders are also 
discretionary, so even if it declares the agreement reckless, it seems that 
the court may – depending on the circumstances – decide not to grant a 
remedy. 
Regarding the legal status of a reckless credit agreement, the Act does not 
classify it as unlawful and thus ab initio null and void.31 This is confirmed by 
the fact that reckless credit agreements are not included in the Act's general 
list in section 89 of credit agreements that are unlawful.32 Consequently, it 
seems clear that the intention is that such agreements remain valid, but that 
the courts are granted special powers to decide on the effects of such 
agreements.33 It should also be noted that a reckless credit agreement is 
not voidable and accordingly none of the remedies involve the setting aside 
of the agreement as such.34 
                                            
25  When a court must determine whether credit was granted recklessly, it must consider 
the situation at the time when the agreement was made and not the situation when 
the determination is being made. See section 80(2) of the NCA. 
26  Sections 130(4)(a) read with ss 80 and 83 of the NCA. 
27  Van Heerden and Boraine 2011 De Jure 401; Kelly-Louw "Consumer Credit" para 
137 fn 3. 
28  Originally only a court had these powers, but s 25 of the National Credit Amendment 
Act 19 of 2014 has extended these powers to the Tribunal.  
29  Section 83(1) of the NCA. The court may exercise this power of its own accord (mero 
motu): see Van Heerden "Over-indebtedness and Reckless Credit" para 11.5.7; Otto 
and Otto National Credit Act Explained 4th ed 90; Boraine and Van Heerden 2010 
THRHR 651; Van Heerden and Boraine 2011 De Jure 400-401. 
30  See Kelly para 8. However, also see University of Stellenbosch Legal Aid Clinic v 
Minister of Justice and Correctional Services 2016 6 SA 596 (CC) para 49, where – 
in arguably an obiter dictum – the Constitutional Court did not regard there to be 
such a discretion. 
31  Boraine and Van Heerden 2010 THRHR 650-651, 655. Also see Van Heerden 
"Over-indebtedness and Reckless Credit" para 11.5.7.1. 
32  Boraine and Van Heerden 2010 THRHR 650, 651; Van Heerden and Boraine 2011 
De Jure 401. 
33  Boraine and Van Heerden 2010 THRHR 651. 
34  Boraine and Van Heerden 2010 THRHR 652. 
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2.2 The reckless credit remedies 
The NCA essentially provides for three categories of reckless credit, each 
having its own consequences, namely the specific orders or remedies that 
can be granted – although there is some overlap.35 
2.2.1 Categories one and two 
In the first category of reckless credit, the agreement will be reckless if the 
credit provider failed to conduct the assessment referred to above, 
irrespective of what the outcome of such an assessment might have been 
at the time.36 The second category is if the credit provider did make the 
required assessment but "entered into the credit agreement with the 
consumer despite the fact that the preponderance of information available 
to the credit provider indicated that the consumer did not generally 
understand or appreciate the consumer's risks, costs or obligations under 
the proposed credit agreement".37 
Under both categories the court or Tribunal has a discretion to make either 
of the following two orders:38 
(1) an order "setting aside all or part of the consumer's rights and 
obligations under that agreement, as the court determines just and 
reasonable in the circumstances" (henceforth referred to as the 
"setting-aside remedy"; or 
(2) an order "suspending the force and effect of that credit agreement" 
until a date determined by the court when the order of suspension is 
made (henceforth referred to as the "suspension remedy"). 
A preliminary question is whether the court can grant both remedies by, for 
instance, setting aside a portion of the debt as well as suspending the 
repayment of the remaining portion? The NCA seems to insist on a choice 
between the two and does not appear to allow a combination. This is 
unfortunate, since it is conceivable that a combination of the remedies could 
be a feasible solution under certain circumstances. 
                                            
35  See generally Boraine and Van Heerden 2010 THRHR 651-652; Van Heerden and 
Boraine 2011 De Jure 393-394. Also see Kelly-Louw "Consumer Credit" para 137.  
36  Section 80(1)(a) read with s 81(2) of the NCA. 
37  Section 80(1)(b)(i) read with s 81(2) of the NCA. 
38  Section 83(2)(a)-(b) read with s 83(3)(b)(i) of the NCA. 
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The Act does not say anything more on the details of the setting-aside 
remedy, but it does provide more information on the suspension remedy. It 
stipulates that, during the period of suspension, "the consumer is not 
required to make any payment required under the agreement"; "no interest, 
fee or other charge under the agreement may be charged to the consumer"; 
and "the credit provider's rights under the agreement, or under any law in 
respect of that agreement, are unenforceable, despite any law to the 
contrary".39 Therefore, the credit provider's penalty lies therein that, during 
this period, it will not receive any payment in respect of the agreement, that 
it will forfeit interest and other charges that would have accrued, and that it 
will not be able to enforce the agreement and repossess any property.40 In 
effect, a payment moratorium is created during the suspension period, but 
the consumer remains indebted to the credit provider.41 The apparent 
purpose of the suspension is to assist the consumer to eventually repay the 
debt.42 
The Act also provides that, when the suspension ends, all the rights and 
obligations of the credit provider and consumer are "revived" and "fully 
enforceable except to the extent that a court may order otherwise".43 
However, the Act stresses that, after the suspension ends, the credit 
provider may not retrospectively charge the consumer for any interest, fee 
or other charge that it could not charge during the suspension period.44 It 
can be mentioned in passing that there appears to be somewhat of a 
contradiction here.45 Although the Act states that all the rights and 
obligations will revive and will thus be fully enforceable after the suspension 
ends, this notion of a full revival of all rights and obligations of the parties is 
a misnomer and should not be taken literally, since it is not true that all rights 
become fully enforceable once more. Indeed, this principle – stated in 
seemingly absolute terms ("all" and "fully") – is significantly curtailed by the 
rule that no liability accrues on the consumer's part for interest et cetera 
during the suspension period. Fortunately, this contradiction is relatively 
minor and hopefully will have little practical implication. The legislature 
probably merely meant to convey the intention that, after suspension, the 
                                            
39  Section 84(1)(a)-(b) of the NCA. See Mbatha para 48. 
40  Van Heerden and Boraine 2011 De Jure 405. 
41  Boraine and Van Heerden 2010 THRHR 654. 
42  Boraine and Van Heerden 2010 THRHR 654. 
43  Section 84(2)(a)(i)-(ii) of the NCA. The fact that the court may order otherwise seems 
to suggest that a further suspension is possible after the first one ends, but this is 
unclear: see Boraine and Van Heerden 2010 THRHR 654, 656. 
44  Section 84(2)(b) of the NCA. 
45  My gratitude to one of the anonymous reviewers who pointed this contradiction out 
to me and suggested that I briefly address it. 
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contractual relationship between the parties will go ahead as normal but 
that, when it comes to calculating the consumer's liability, the suspension 
period (and the costs that would have accrued during this time) are, as it 
were, erased from memory. 
Regarding the setting-aside remedy, the NCA says nothing more than that 
it can be done in part or in full and, importantly, that the order must be just 
and reasonable in the circumstances. In Standard Bank v Kelly46 the court 
advised that the decision "will in general be informed by the statute's policy 
of promoting equity in the credit market and by the consideration of assisting 
the consumer to fully repay responsibly undertaken debt at the expense, if 
necessary and appropriate, of subordinating the rights of reckless 
creditors". 
In SA Taxi Securitisation v Mbatha47 the court suggested that the setting-
aside remedy involves the setting aside of the agreement itself and thus that 
"the agreement would be null and void, and as if it had never been".48 
However, a careful reading of the Act does not reveal this consequence, 
since nothing in the Act suggests that the agreement is void. Moreover, the 
NCA does not empower the court to set aside the agreement in the sense 
of its being voidable, but instead the court may merely set aside all or part 
of the rights and obligations of the consumer.49 The Act does not mention 
the rights and obligations of the credit provider, but the reciprocal nature of 
the contract implies that, if the rights and obligations of the consumer are 
set aside, the countervailing rights and obligations of the credit provider 
must logically also fall away.50 
It is worth highlighting that a suspension or setting aside may follow for the 
first two categories of reckless credit even if the consumer is not over-
indebted at the time the matter is adjudicated.51 However, it is arguable that 
over-indebtedness should nevertheless always be a factor when deciding 
on which remedy to grant, since the remedy should generally be focussed 
on rectifying any negative consequences of the reckless loan and should 
not lead to an unjustified windfall for the consumer. 
                                            
46  Kelly para 8. 
47  Mbatha para 47. 
48  Also see Mohlabi para 10. 
49  Boraine and Van Heerden 2010 THRHR 652. 
50  Boraine and Van Heerden 2010 THRHR 653. 
51  Boraine and Van Heerden 2010 THRHR 652; Van Heerden and Boraine 2011 De 
Jure 402. 
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2.2.2 Category three 
The third category of reckless credit is if the credit provider did make the 
required assessment, but "entered into the credit agreement with the 
consumer despite the fact that entering into that credit agreement would 
make the consumer over-indebted".52 In this situation, the court or Tribunal 
"must further consider whether the consumer is over-indebted at the time of 
those proceedings" and if it is concluded that the consumer is indeed over-
indebted, the court or Tribunal has the discretion to make an order:53 
(1) "suspending the force and effect of that credit agreement until a date 
determined by the Court when making the order of suspension"; and  
(2) "restructuring the consumer's obligations under any other credit 
agreements". 
Before making such an order, the court or Tribunal must consider "the 
consumer's current means and ability to pay the consumer's current 
financial obligations that existed at the time the agreement was made" as 
well as "the expected date when any such obligation under a credit 
agreement will be fully satisfied, assuming the consumer makes all required 
payments in accordance with any proposed order".54  
Moreover, the restructuring must be done in accordance with the 
magistrates' courts powers to rearrange a consumer's obligations as part of 
the debt review process.55 Hence, the consumer's obligations can be re-
arranged by:56 
(1) "extending the period of the agreement and reducing the amount of 
each payment due accordingly"; 
                                            
52  Section 80(1)(b)(ii) read with s 81(2) of the NCA. S 88(4) seemingly provides for a 
fourth category: "If a credit provider enters into a credit agreement, other than a 
consolidation agreement contemplated in this section, with a consumer who has 
applied for a debt re-arrangement and that re-arrangement still subsists, all or part 
of that new credit agreement may be declared to be reckless credit, whether or not 
the circumstances set out in section 80 apply." As Boraine and Van Heerden 2010 
THRHR 652 point out, no consequences are ascribed to this category. 
53  Sections 83(3)(a) and (b)(i)-(ii) of the NCA. See further Van Heerden "Over-
indebtedness and Reckless Credit" para 11.5.7.2. 
54  Section 83(4)(a)-(b) of the NCA. 
55  Section 83(3)(b)(ii) read with s 87 of the NCA. 
56  Section 87(1)(b)(ii) read with s 86(7)(c)(ii)(aa)-(dd) of the NCA. 
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(2) "postponing during a specified period the dates on which payments 
are due under the agreement";  
(3) "extending the period of the agreement and postponing during a 
specified period the dates on which payments are due under the 
agreement"; or  
(4)  "recalculating the consumer's obligations because of contraventions 
of Part A or B of Chapter 5, or Part A of Chapter 6". 
2.2.3 Summary 
Accordingly, depending on the kind of reckless credit involved, the court or 
Tribunal may: 
(1) set aside the consumer's rights and obligations in part or in full, in 
accordance with what would be just and reasonable;  
(2) suspend the force and effect of the agreement for a certain period; 
or  
(3) suspend the force and effect of the agreement for a certain period 
plus restructure any of the consumer's other obligations. 
When considering the different categories of reckless credit, it is apparent 
that the setting-aside remedy is not available for the third category, and that 
the restructuring remedy is not available for the first two categories. 
Suspension alone is also not possible for the third category, since it must 
be combined with a restructuring order. It is not clear why the legislature 
took this approach. On what basis should a setting-aside remedy not be 
available for the third category? And why should a restructuring order not 
be available for the first two categories? To my mind it would have been 
simpler to make all the remedies available in each instance, and then leave 
it up to the courts to exercise a proper discretion. It would also have been 
useful if the "just and reasonable" standard was required for each of the 
remedies and not for the setting-aside remedy only. 
It can be mentioned that, notwithstanding what category the situation falls 
into, if the consumer can convincingly allege his over-indebtedness, the 
court is permitted to grant relief in the form of a debt rearrangement order.57 
                                            
57  Section 85(b) read with s 87 of the NCA. 
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Therefore, the usual debt rearrangement remedy is, when appropriate, 
available as an alternative option. 
One should also consider that the granting of reckless credit qualifies as 
prohibited conduct under the NCA, and hence the Tribunal may impose an 
administrative fine on a credit provider who has engaged in such 
behaviour.58 If a credit provider repeatedly fails to comply with the Act, the 
Tribunal may also suspend or cancel its registration as a credit provider.59 
2.3 Some of the major uncertainties surrounding the remedies 
Several uncertainties surround the application of these remedies, and 
authors like Boraine and Van Heerden have analysed these in detail.60 In 
what follows I summarise the three most pressing uncertainties. Further 
below, I argue that a constitutional perspective may help to answer some of 
these doubts. 
2.3.1 Uncertainty one 
The first uncertainty is that it is not clear how a court should exercise its 
discretion when it comes to the choice between the setting-aside and 
suspension remedies. Also, if the court chooses the setting-aside remedy, 
how should it decide between setting it aside in part or in full?61 Van 
Heerden and Boraine provide some suggestions in this regard, but it is not 
necessary to repeat these here.62 Further below, I add my suggestions in 
this regard. 
2.3.2 Uncertainty two 
A second difficulty with the remedies is that the Act does not distinguish 
between the situations where the parties merely entered into the reckless 
credit agreement and those where either or both of them have already 
                                            
58  Section 151 of the NCA. 
59  Section 57 of the NCA. 
60  Boraine and Van Heerden 2010 THRHR 651, 652-656; Van Heerden and Boraine 
2011 De Jure 402-408, 414-415; Van Heerden "Over-indebtedness and Reckless 
Credit" para 11.5.7.1. 
61  Boraine and Van Heerden 2010 THRHR 651, 652; Van Heerden and Boraine 2011 
De Jure 402-403, 414-415; Van Heerden "Over-indebtedness and Reckless Credit" 
para 11.5.7.1. 
62  See eg Van Heerden and Boraine 2011 De Jure 404, 415; Van Heerden "Over-
indebtedness and Reckless Credit" para 11.5.7.1. 
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performed in terms of the agreement.63 This is not really a problem for the 
suspension, restructuring or partial setting-aside remedy, since the 
contractual relationship between the parties will continue – either as normal 
after the suspension ends, or in accordance with the restructured or reduced 
obligations of the consumer. 
Also, the matter seems relatively uncomplicated in instances where neither 
of the parties have performed yet and the obligations of the consumer are 
set aside in full. This would effectively amount to a cancellation of the 
agreement – it would end the credit relationship and absolve the parties 
from further reciprocal performance.64 However, what would be the situation 
if either or both parties have performed (either in full or in part) and the 
consumer's obligations are set aside in full? Can the credit provider reclaim 
any moneys advanced or property delivered to the consumer, and can the 
consumer reclaim any payments made to the credit provider?65 
Boraine and Van Heerden argue that, because section 83(2)(a) refers to the 
setting aside of rights and obligations "under that agreement", there is no 
restriction on the credit provider's ability to claim money or goods in terms 
of another cause of action, such as unjustified enrichment.66 The Act also 
does not expressly oust any other causes of action.67 Boraine and Van 
Heerden thus contend that the parties should be able to reclaim at least 
some of what they have performed.68 In this respect, Sonnekus has also 
argued that the credit provider should have a claim in unjustified enrichment 
against the consumer.69 Further below, I make a suggestion based on 
constitutional property law. 
2.3.3 Uncertainty three 
A third question is: what should happen to the property that is subject to the 
reckless credit agreement? When it comes to movable property that is 
                                            
63  Boraine and Van Heerden 2010 THRHR 652; Van Heerden and Boraine 2011 De 
Jure 402. Also see Van Heerden "Over-indebtedness and Reckless Credit" para 
11.5.7.1. 
64  Boraine and Van Heerden 2010 THRHR 653; Van Heerden and Boraine 2011 De 
Jure 403. Also see Van Heerden "Over-indebtedness and Reckless Credit" para 
11.5.7.1. 
65  Boraine and Van Heerden 2010 THRHR 653; Van Heerden and Boraine 2011 De 
Jure 403. 
66  Boraine and Van Heerden 2010 THRHR 653; Van Heerden and Boraine 2011 De 
Jure 403, 415. Also see Van Heerden "Over-indebtedness and Reckless Credit" 
para 11.5.7.1. 
67  Boraine and Van Heerden 2010 THRHR 656. 
68  Boraine and Van Heerden 2010 THRHR 655, 656. 
69  Sonnekus 2016 TSAR 361. 
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subject to a lease or instalment agreement, this issue is particularly thorny 
because, in most instances, the credit provider would have reserved 
ownership until the debt is fully paid.70 In cases of restructuring or partial 
setting aside, the answer is relatively straightforward, since the consumer 
would simply remain in possession as normal while the remaining debt is 
being paid off or while the restructured payment plan is being completed. In 
the event of a full setting aside of the consumer's obligations, it has been 
suggested that "the credit provider, who remains the owner of the vehicle, 
would be entitled to restoration of the vehicle".71 
In cases where the effects of a lease or instalment agreement pertaining to 
movable property are suspended, it is particularly difficult to determine what 
should happen with the property.72 Boraine and Van Heerden refer to two 
possible answers. The first option is that the movable property should 
remain with the consumer during the period of suspension. The reasons for 
this theory include: the enforcement of the agreement (including the credit 
provider's right to repossess the property) is barred during suspension; the 
consumer is under no express duty to return the property for the period of 
the suspension; and the agreement is not cancelled or set aside.73 
The second option is that the property should be returned to the credit 
provider during the suspension period. This theory is based on the goal of 
the Act to balance the rights of consumers and credit providers, which 
arguably renders it unfair to allow the consumer to retain the credit 
provider's depreciating security while not having to make any payments.74 
The second option has found support in case law75 and is also the one 
favoured by Van Heerden and Boraine.76 
Even so, there remains doubt regarding effect of especially a suspension 
order on movable property that is subject to a lease or instalment 
agreement, but for present purposes the focus is on mortgage agreements, 
so it is not necessary to express a concrete view. That being said, the 
arguments I make below regarding the impact of section 25(1) of the 
                                            
70  See the definitions of "instalment agreement" and "lease" in s 1 of the Act. 
71  Mbatha para 47. Also see SA Taxi Securitisation (Pty) Ltd v Chesane 2010 6 SA 557 
(GSJ) para 28; Nako para 29; SA Taxi Securitisation (Pty) Ltd v Xolile 2012 JOL 
29510 (ECM) para 24; Campher para 15. 
72  Van Heerden and Boraine 2011 De Jure 405. 
73  Van Heerden and Boraine 2011 De Jure 405. 
74  Van Heerden and Boraine 2011 De Jure 406, 407. 
75  Mbatha paras 45-48, 55; Nako para 29. 
76  Van Heerden and Boraine 2011 De Jure 407, 415. Also see Van Heerden "Over-
indebtedness and Reckless Credit" para 11.5.7.1. 
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Constitution on the formulation of these remedies, will perhaps shed some 
light in the movable context too. 
In the case of mortgage agreements, it is trite that the consumer remains 
the owner of the immovable property, while the credit provider holds a 
limited real right in the property as security until the debt is discharged.77 In 
these cases, the full setting aside of the consumer's obligations will naturally 
have the effect that the real security right extinguishes, which is a 
consequence of the accessoriness principle.78 Neither a partial setting aside 
nor a suspension will have this effect, and thus the credit provider's security 
will remain intact for the remaining portion of the debt or will become 
enforceable again once the suspension period ends. In none of these 
instances will the consumer lose his ownership of the property, and none of 
the reckless credit remedies permit a sale in execution of the property. Also, 
there is no basis upon which the creditor can temporarily dispossess the 
consumer during the suspension period. 
This outcome may seem unfair in some mortgage cases. For instance, a full 
setting aside will mean that the property is totally freed of the mortgage while 
the consumer does not have to pay anything more toward the loan. The 
benefit enjoyed by the consumer and the attendant losses experienced by 
the credit provider may sometimes seem out of proportion compared to the 
damage inflicted on the consumer by the credit provider's reckless lending 
conduct. Below, I explain with reference to section 25(1) of the Constitution 
that the content of any remedy must be designed to ensure that there is a 
proper level of proportionality between the purpose of the remedy and the 
effects thereof. 
3 The property clause and reckless credit 
3.1 General 
The general purpose of constitutional property law is to achieve a balance 
between the protection of vested rights and the promotion of the public 
interest in regulating the use of property.79 To this end, section 25(1) of the 
Constitution (the property clause) provides that no one may be deprived of 
                                            
77  The same is true for movables under a secured loan or pawn transaction. 
78  Boraine and Van Heerden 2010 THRHR 653. 
79  First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Commissioner, South African Revenue 
Service; First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Minister of Finance 2002 4 SA 
768 (CC) (hereafter FNB) para 50; Van der Walt Constitutional Property 100-101; 
Mostert and Badenhorst "Property" para 3FN6.2.2; Roux "Property" para 46.1. 
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property except in terms of law of general application and that no law may 
permit the arbitrary deprivation of property.80 Arguably, this constitutional 
norm can find useful application in the context of the NCA's remedies for 
reckless lending. There are at least three important questions revealed by 
section 25(1) for the present purposes: Does the creditor's right to receive 
payment under the credit agreement qualify as "property"? Do the remedies 
involve a "deprivation" of such property? And is this deprivation of property 
"arbitrary"?81 
3.2 Creditors' rights as "property" 
In the case of a mortgage agreement, the creditor primarily has two kinds 
of rights: first the personal claim for the repayment of the loan in accordance 
with the terms of the contract, and secondly the accessory real security right 
of mortgage. The question is whether these rights qualify as "property" for 
constitutional purposes? 
The Constitution does not define "property" but states that "property is not 
limited to land",82 which at least implies that property includes land. The 
Constitutional Court has also confirmed that land and corporeal movables 
are at the heart of the concept of property.83 However, nowhere does the 
Constitution limit the concept to tangible assets, and accordingly 
commentators accept that the property concept should be interpreted 
generously to include, for instance, economically significant intangible 
assets.84 
Classifying a mortgage as property is relatively straightforward. A mortgage 
is a limited real right in tangible immovable property, and hence the right of 
mortgage itself is commonly regarded as incorporeal immovable property.85 
                                            
80  On the property clause in general, see Van der Walt Constitutional Property; Roux 
and Davis "Property" ch 20; Mostert and Badenhorst "Property" ch 3FB; Badenhorst, 
Pienaar and Mostert Law of Property ch 21; Roux "Property" ch 46. Ss 25(2)-(9) of 
the Constitution deals with expropriation and land reform. These matters fall outside 
the scope of this article, as they do not relate to reckless credit.  
81  The methodology for deciding a s 25 case was first established in FNB para 46. For 
the present purposes it is not necessary to fully explain the methodology or to go 
through every step. See further Roux "Property" para 46.1. 
82  Section 25(4)(b) of the Constitution. 
83  FNB para 51. 
84  Van der Walt Constitutional Property 93, 114; Roux "Property" para 46.3(b); Roux 
and Davis "Property" para 20.3; Mostert and Badenhorst "Property" para 3FB6.1.2. 
85  Badenhorst, Pienaar and Mostert Law of Property 36. 
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Since "property" includes rights in property,86 such as limited real rights,87 it 
is not controversial therefore that a mortgage, as a real security right, 
qualifies as "property" for the purposes of section 25(1).88 
The credit provider's claim for the repayment of the loan is more complex, 
since this personal right is neither a traditional object of property nor a right 
in property. Notwithstanding, there is strong support in academic 
scholarship for the prospect that a contractual right with a monetary value 
(an incorporeal thing) qualifies as "property" for constitutional purposes.89 
There are also several judgments of the high court and at least one of the 
Supreme Court of Appeal that support this view.90 
Moreover, the Constitutional Court has on more than one occasion 
recognised personal rights as property for the purposes of section 25(1). 
The best example is National Credit Regulator v Opperman,91 where the 
Court explained that, although a personal right is not a real right in property 
like ownership, the property clause does not deal with ownership but with 
property. The Court had previously assumed without finding that a claim for 
                                            
86  FNB para 51. Also see para 100(e), where it is implied that rights less than ownership 
are also protected. 
87  Van der Walt Constitutional Property 140; Badenhorst, Pienaar and Mostert Law of 
Property 536; Roux "Property" para 46(b). Also see Ex parte Optimal Property 
Solutions 2003 2 SA 136 (C) para 19, where a servitude was classified as "property"; 
and Agri SA v Minister for Minerals and Energy 2013 4 SA 1 (CC) paras 32-44, where 
mineral rights were classified as "property". 
88  Commentators agree that all (limited) real rights recognised by common law should 
be protected as constitutional property: see eg Van der Walt Constitutional Property 
140; Roux "Property" para 46.3(b); Mostert and Badenhorst "Property" para 
3FB6.2.2; Badenhorst, Pienaar and Mostert Law of Property 536; Brits Mortgage 
Foreclosure para 6.4.2.2; Brits Real Security 99. See also Gainsford v Tiffski 
Property Investments (Pty) Ltd 2012 3 SA 35 (SCA) paras 42-47, where it seems as 
if the Supreme Court of Appeal would have been willing to regard a mortgage as 
"property" were it not for the fact that in casu the mortgage was ab initio void due to 
s 34(1) of the Insolvency Act 24 of 1936. 
89  Van der Walt Constitutional Property 96; Roux and Davis "Property" para 20.3; 
Mostert and Badenhorst "Property" para 3FB6.1.2, 6.2.2; Roux "Property" para 
46.3(a), (c); Marais 2016 TSAR 581; Marais 2014 SALJ 217-222; Brits Real Security 
11; Brits 2013 PELJ 465; Brits Mortgage Foreclosure para 6.4.2.3. See also Otto 
and Otto National Credit Act Explained 2nd ed 115 and n 158; Scott 2010 THRHR 
623, 636; Cloete 2003 Obiter 71, 80-81. 
90  See eg FirstRand Bank v BL Smith (24205/08) WLD (31 October 2008) (copy on file 
with author) para 25; Rossouw v FirstRand Bank Ltd 2010 6 SA 439 (SCA) paras 
17, 42; African Banking Corporation of Botswana Ltd v Kariba Furniture 
Manufacturers (Pty) Ltd 2013 6 SA 471 (GNP) para 45; Opperman v Boonzaaier 
2012 ZAWCHC 27 (17 April 2012) para 18; Troskie v Von Holdt 2013 ZAECGHC 31 
(11 April 2013) para 37. 
91  National Credit Regulator v Opperman 2013 2 SA 1 (CC) (hereafter Opperman) para 
61. 
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loss of earning capacity qualifies as "property"92 and thus in Opperman the 
Court explained that "the recognition of the right to restitution of money paid, 
based on unjustified enrichment, as property under section 25(1) is logical 
and realistic".93 By implication the Court also agreed with the main reasons 
given by the court a quo94 for why the restitution claim amounted to property, 
namely that this personal right is a concrete asset in the credit provider's 
estate, that it has a monetary value, and that it is transferable.95 The Court 
therefore concluded that the enrichment claim in casu qualified as "property" 
for the purposes of section 25 of the Constitution.96 Another example is 
Chevron v Wilson,97 where the Constitutional Court accepted that moneys 
paid to a credit provider qualify as "property" in the credit provider's hands. 
Therefore, from case law it is abundantly clear that a personal right that 
originates in unjustified enrichment amounts to "property" for constitutional 
purposes. By analogy, one can therefore comfortably accept that a 
contractual right with a monetary value qualifies as "property" too. This 
prospect is strengthened by the fact that the Constitutional Court has also 
held that personal rights under a liquor licence – a category far more 
controversial than contractual claims – qualify as "property" for 
constitutional purposes.98 
3.3 The effects of the remedies as "deprivation" of property 
Assuming then that the contractual and security rights of credit providers 
qualify as property, the next question is whether the granting of any of the 
reckless credit remedies involves a deprivation of such property. In other 
words, if a setting-aside, suspension or restructuring order is granted, is the 
credit provider "deprived" of property? 
In First National Bank v Commissioner of SARS the Constitutional Court 
accepted that deprivation is a wide concept that includes "any interference 
with the use, enjoyment or exploitation of private property".99 In Mkontwana 
                                            
92  Law Society of South Africa v Minister of Transport 2011 2 BCLR 150 (CC) para 84. 
93  Opperman para 63, citing Van der Walt Constitutional Property 115-116, 141-142. 
94  Opperman v Boonzaaier 2012 ZAWCHC 27 (17 April 2012) para 18. 
95  Opperman para 57. 
96  Opperman para Para 64. Also see Cherangani Trade and Invest 107 (Pty) Ltd v 
Mason 2011 11 BCLR 1123 (CC) para 8; Cool Ideas 1186 CC v Hubbard 2014 4 SA 
474 (CC) para 38. 
97  Chevron SA (Pty) Ltd v Wilson t/a Wilson's Transport 2015 10 BCLR 1158 (CC) para 
16 (hereafter Chevron). Also see para 18. 
98  Shoprite Checkers (Pty) Ltd v MEC for Economic Development, Eastern Cape 2015 
6 SA 125 (CC) paras 57-72. See further Marais 2016 TSAR 576-592; Rautenbach 
2015 TSAR 825-829; Slade 2015 JQR para 2.1. 
99  FNB para 57. 
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v Nelson Mandela Metropolitan Municipality100 the Court seemingly 
regressed from this broad definition by finding that it needs to be a 
substantive interference that goes beyond the normal restrictions on 
property in an open and democratic society. However, in later judgments 
the Court appeared to have accepted the wider definition again,101 and in 
Opperman102 the Court confirmed that, for the interference to qualify as a 
deprivation, it must at least be "significant enough to have a legally relevant 
impact" on the affected rights. 
For the present purposes, it is in my reasonably undisputed view that, when 
granted, each of the reckless credit remedies deprives the credit provider of 
its property. Although the degree of interference differs, both the setting-
aside, suspension and restructuring remedies clearly entail legally 
significant interferences with or modifications of the enjoyment and/or 
enforcement of the credit provider's rights under the credit agreement. 
3.4 The arbitrariness test 
It is important to emphasise that, just because the creditor's rights are 
regarded as "property" and just because the undoing or modification of such 
rights qualifies as a "deprivation", this does not necessarily indicate that the 
statutorily authorised restriction is constitutionally problematic. A deprivation 
of property is never unconstitutional per se. The regulation (or deprivation) 
of the use and enjoyment of property in the public interest is a normal part 
of life in a democratic society, and thus it must be emphasised that only an 
"arbitrary" deprivation of property will violate the right contained in section 
25(1). 
The leading definition of the arbitrariness test is found in the Constitutional 
Court's FNB judgment. The Court found that the deprivation is arbitrary if 
the law "does not provide sufficient reason for the particular deprivation in 
question or is procedurally unfair".103 Consequently, there are two forms of 
                                            
100  Mkontwana v Nelson Mandela Metropolitan Municipality; Bissett v Buffalo City 
Municipality; Transfer Rights Action Campaign v Member of the Executive Council 
for Local Government and Housing, Gauteng 2005 1 SA 530 (CC) para 32. Also see 
Chevron paras 17-19. 
101  See eg Reflect-All 1025 CC v MEC for Public Transport, Roads and Works, Gauteng 
Provincial Government 2009 6 SA 391 (CC) para 36; Offit Enterprises (Pty) Ltd v 
Coega Development Corporation (Pty) Ltd 2011 1 SA 293 (CC) paras 38-39, 41; 
Tshwane City v Link Africa 2015 6 SA 440 (CC) para 58; and see further Van der 
Walt Constitutional Property 206-209. 
102  Opperman para 66. Also compare South African Diamond Producers Organisation 
v Minister of Minerals and Energy 2017 6 SA 331 (CC) paras 42-48. 
103  FNB para 100. 
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arbitrariness: substantive arbitrariness (insufficient reason) and procedural 
arbitrariness (procedurally unfair). 
Although it is not clear what exactly is meant with procedural 
arbitrariness,104 in both Opperman and Chevron, for instance, the 
Constitutional Court found that the relevant deprivations were procedurally 
arbitrary because the statutory provisions in question did not afford the court 
a discretion, based on the facts of the case, whether or not to uphold the 
deprivation.105 For the present purposes it can therefore be accepted that 
the provisions pertaining to the remedies for reckless credit are probably not 
procedurally arbitrary. The reason for this is that, in each instance, the court 
(or Tribunal) has a discretion as to whether or not to make the order. It also 
has a discretion regarding the content of each order – for instance the time 
period of the suspension and the extent of the setting aside. Regarding the 
latter remedy, the court is also required to make an order that is just and 
reasonable in the circumstances, which affords the court a large leeway to 
ensure that the order is justifiable on the facts of each case. Moreover, the 
restructuring remedy allows for a large degree of flexibility with respect to 
how the obligations can be rearranged. In other words, the fact that the court 
has oversight and wide discretionary powers when it comes to these 
remedies indicates that the procedural fairness requirement should rarely 
cause problems. The way the discretion is exercised is another matter, 
which relates to the second leg of the arbitrariness test. 
The substantive arbitrariness test requires that the deprivation in question 
must have a sufficient reason. This test is very flexible and context sensitive, 
since the Court in FNB emphasised that it must "be decided on all the 
relevant facts of each particular case".106 Basically, one must evaluate "the 
relationship between the means employed, namely the deprivation in 
question and the ends sought to be achieved, namely the purpose of the 
law in question".107 In this respect one must consider a complexity of 
relationships, such as those between the purpose of the deprivation and the 
person whose property is affected; between the purpose of the deprivation 
and the nature of the property; and between the purpose and extent of the 
deprivation.108 The Court also indicated that the type of property right 
involved (ownership versus a lesser right) as well as the extent of the 
deprivation (embracing all versus only some of the incidents of the right) 
                                            
104  Compare Van der Walt 2012 Stell LR 88-94. 
105  Opperman paras 69, 76; Chevron paras 22-24. 
106  FNB para 100(h). 
107  FNB para 100(a). 
108  FNB para 100(b)-(d). 
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could impact on how compelling the purpose of the deprivation would have 
to be to pass the arbitrariness test.109 
In other words, not only must the deprivation be buttressed by a valid public 
purpose, but in each individual case there must also be a sufficient 
relationship between this purpose and the effect that the deprivation has on 
the person whose property is affected.110 Depending on the facts, the level 
of scrutiny will then be somewhere on a continuum between a mere 
rationality test and a proportionality test almost as strict as the one 
contemplated in section 36 of the Constitution.111 
It is easy to identify and justify the purpose behind the reckless credit 
remedies. The NCA expressly seeks to discourage reckless lending and the 
ills that accompany it. Preventing and remedying reckless credit is also of 
socio-economic significance, since unaffordable loans can cause social and 
economic devastation for consumers, their families and society at large. 
Preventing the granting of unaffordable loans also contributes to the 
protection of consumers' inherent human dignity112 and it instils prudential 
integrity in the broader financial industry. Hence, the first intended effect of 
these remedies is to discourage credit providers from concluding reckless 
credit agreements with consumers and, to this effect, to encourage them to 
do the required pre-agreement assessments.113 The second intended effect 
is to provide debt relief for consumers who have suffered prejudice as a 
result of entering into a reckless credit agreement. 
Although it is true that the reckless credit remedies have the effect of 
penalising the reckless credit provider,114 in my view this effect is only 
incidental and not the prime purpose of these remedies. Instead, it is 
contended that the main aim is to bring relief to consumers who are over-
indebted as a result of being granted credit in a reckless fashion. There are 
other ways to "punish" the responsible credit provider, such as with an 
                                            
109  FNB para 100(e)-(f). 
110  Compare the analysis by Brits 2013 PELJ 446-457 of the high court's and the 
Constitutional Court's application of the arbitrariness test in Opperman. 
111  FNB para 100(g). 
112  See s 10 of the Constitution. 
113  See eg ABSA Bank v Coe Family Trust 2012 3 SA 184 (WCC) 188H-I; Campher) 
para 15; Plastomark (Pty) Ltd v CK Injection Moulders CC; In re: Ultrapolymers (Pty) 
Ltd v CK Injection Moulders CC 2015 ZAWCHC 129 (1 September 2015) para 14. 
Also see ABSA Bank Limited v Potgieter 2017 ZAECPEHC 8 (31 January 2017) para 
60. 
114  Van Heerden and Boraine 2011 De Jure 393; Vessio 2009 TSAR 281. 
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administrative fine imposed by the Tribunal,115 or by suspending or 
cancelling its registration as a credit provider.116 
In other words, there can hardly be any doubt about the general validity of 
the purpose behind the NCA's reckless credit provisions. However, the 
question is whether, in each individual case, there is a sufficient relationship 
between the purpose of the remedy and the effect thereof on the particular 
credit provider. Does the Act allow enough flexibility in the implementation 
of these remedies so that, in individual cases, arbitrary outcomes can be 
avoided? To my mind, a case cannot be made to declare the provisions in 
the NCA, which stipulate for these remedies, unconstitutional for permitting 
arbitrary deprivation of property. The fact that the NCA provides a wide 
discretion for the courts, not only when it comes to whether a remedy should 
be granted but also when it comes to the content of the remedies, indicates 
that the Act is nuanced enough to avoid both procedural and substantive 
arbitrariness. 
4 Applying the arbitrariness test to the remedies 
Although the sections in the NCA that provide for the reckless credit 
remedies do not fall short of section 25(1) of the Constitution in general, it 
is important that these provisions are applied in such a manner that arbitrary 
outcomes are avoided in individual cases – that a constitutionally 
appropriate balance is achieved between the interests of the credit provider 
and consumer in question. Regarding the court's discretion, the substantive 
arbitrariness test can in fact assist courts when deciding whether to grant a 
remedy as well as on the content of the remedy. In each case a court should 
ascertain what the effect on the credit provider would be and then ask 
whether such an effect is justified by the purpose of the remedy. 
A general proposition is that the effect of any remedy should go only as far 
as is necessary to rectify the consequences of the reckless credit 
agreement – of the credit provider's prohibited behaviour. If it stays within 
such bounds, the deprivation of property has a sufficient reason and hence 
it is not arbitrary. But if it goes further than necessary, it becomes arbitrary 
because the effect on the credit provider is no longer sufficiently linked to 
the prejudice that was caused by the credit provider's actions. Take a simple 
example: If a credit provider grants a reckless loan of R100 000 and 
because thereof the consumer becomes over-indebted with R40 000, it 
                                            
115  Section 151 of the NCA. 
116  Section 57 of the NCA. 
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would be arbitrary for a court to set aside the entire R100 000. Accordingly, 
the court should consider all factors, including the financial situation, to 
determine the appropriate remedy. Courts should avoid granting generic 
remedies, and should rather ensure that the content of each remedy is tailor 
made to the facts of the case before it. In view of the serious consequences 
that these remedies might have – especially the setting-aside remedy – 
courts should do a careful analysis and provide detailed reasons for the 
order they hand down. Since a deprivation of property takes place, the court 
is mandated to ensure that there is a sufficient reason for the effect that the 
remedy will have on the credit provider. 
Furthermore, it is suggested that the substantive arbitrariness test can help 
answer some of the points that have been raised by authors with respect to 
the uncertainties that surround the reckless credit remedies. As explained 
above, the main uncertainties that have come to light from academic 
commentary are as follows: 
a) How should one decide between the suspension and setting-aside 
remedies, and in the latter instance, how should one decide between 
a full and partial setting aside? 
b) What happens if either or both parties have performed under the 
agreement? 
c) What is the effect on the credit provider's security? 
Boraine and Van Heerden, have considered these questions and have 
made some good suggestions.117 I should like to add that the property 
clause's arbitrariness test can assist in answering these questions.118 
Essentially, whenever a court is called upon to formulate a remedy in the 
reckless credit context, it would have to do so in a way that avoids any 
arbitrary outcomes. 
Inherent in this test, the court should consider whether and to what extent 
either of the parties have already performed under the agreement. The 
value of such performances should then be taken into account when the 
appropriate remedy is formulated. Consequently, matters of restitution 
should not be left to future litigation surrounding unjustified enrichment. As 
the court in Standard Bank v Kelly119 commented: 
                                            
117  Boraine and Van Heerden 2010 THRHR 651, 652-656; Van Heerden and Boraine 
2011 De Jure 402-408, 414-415; Van Heerden "Over-indebtedness and Reckless 
Credit" para 11.5.7.1. 
118  Also see Brits Mortgage Foreclosure para 6.4.6. 
119  Kelly 8. 
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The court is unlikely to make any order relieving the consumer of its 
obligations if the result would be the unjust enrichment of the consumer at the 
expense of the credit provider. 
This comment is illuminating because it suggests that, when the court 
decides on the remedy, it should make accommodation for the fact that the 
remedy should not unjustifiably enrich the consumer. This supports my 
proposal that the court should, when formulating a just and reasonable 
remedy, consider the performances that have been rendered already. 
A similar approach would apply to the creditor's security. If it is assumed 
that the property remains with the consumer, then to avoid arbitrary 
outcomes, the content of the remedy must accommodate the monetary 
benefits enjoyed by the consumer as a result of having his property freed 
from the credit provider's security right, for example. 
The arbitrariness test can also help to decide between the suspension and 
setting-aside remedies, as well as to decide on the extent of the setting-
aside remedy. Broadly speaking, it will probably be arbitrary to grant a 
certain remedy if another remedy could achieve the same purpose in a way 
that imposes a lesser deprivation of property. Accordingly, to my mind the 
suspension remedy should always be the first choice, and the setting-aside 
remedy should only be an option if a suspension cannot provide the 
necessary relief to the consumer. Setting the consumer's obligations aside 
should not be the default course of action. In fact, courts should probably 
only resort to it in extreme cases.120 
The same reasoning can apply when choosing the extent of a setting-aside 
remedy. The first choice should not be a full setting aside, since a less 
invasive option should be considered first. A full setting aside should be 
ordered only if it is truly necessary to rectify the damage done by the credit 
provider's reckless conduct. 
In De Beer the court unfortunately did not spend a lot of time explaining the 
reason for its remedy. The judge merely stated that his choice of a full 
setting-aside remedy was influenced by three factors:121 
a) the clear extent of the recklessness (the affordability assessment 
was irrational in that the surety's income was taken into account to 
determine the consumer's credit worthiness); 
                                            
120  Also see Otto and Otto National Credit Act Explained 4th ed 91. 
121  De Beer para 65. 
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b) the advanced age of the consumers;122 and 
c) the fact that the property sought to be declared executable was the 
consumers' only home. 
Interestingly, two of the reasons given by the court in De Beer are external 
to the express provisions of the NCA, which do not list the consumer's age 
or his home situation as factors when formulating a remedy. Of course, such 
issues should be included in the "just and reasonable" standard required for 
setting-aside remedies. Also, the extent of the recklessness, and thus the 
level of bad faith or turpitude on the credit provider's part should naturally 
be a strong contributing factor. However, other than these factors, it does 
not seem as if the court gave much (if any) attention to the finer details of 
the consequences of this full setting-aside order. 
Because the performances already rendered did not appear to play a part 
in the court's determination, it seems instinctively that the consumers got an 
over-the-top windfall that is disproportionate to the prejudice they truly 
suffered at the hands of the credit provider's conduct. Also, in view of the 
facts revealed in the judgment, can it truly be said that the credit provider in 
this case deserves this momentous sanction in comparison to its level of 
turpitude and if measured against the prejudice suffered by the consumer? 
It is not suggested that a setting-aside order was inappropriate as such, but 
I am not convinced that a full setting aside of the consumer's obligations 
was just and reasonable on the facts of the case. To my mind, a strong case 
can also be made that the effects on the credit provider amounted to an 
arbitrary deprivation of property. 
It can also be mentioned that a consumer mortgage agreement will very 
often comprise of a home loan. It is trite that this factor has important 
implications for mortgage foreclosure proceedings due to the constitutional 
protection of housing rights.123 It is not necessary to extrapolate on this 
perspective here,124 but suffice it to say that, in appropriate circumstances, 
the fact that the reckless credit agreement involves a home could influence 
the court's decision when formulating the appropriate remedy, as was 
evidently the case in De Beer. 
                                            
122  Also Benade v ABSA Bank Limited 2014 ZAWCHC 84 (16 May 2014) para 36. 
123  Section 26 Constitution; High Court Rule 46(1)(a)(ii); Jaftha v Schoeman; Van 
Rooyen v Stoltz 2005 2 SA 140 (CC); Gundwana v Steko Development 2011 3 SA 
608 (CC). 
124  See Brits Real Security 68-103 and the other sources cited there. 
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7 Conclusion 
The purpose of this article is not to create scepticism regarding the granting 
of the reckless credit remedies, but to highlight the importance of not making 
snap judgments on what remedy to grant.125 More specifically, the main 
argument is that section 25(1) of the Constitution, and the principles 
underlying it, should play a role in formulating the appropriate remedy in 
each individual case. Because a credit provider's contractual claim to 
repayment of the loan as well as its real security right qualify as "property" 
and because each of the remedies potentially "deprives" the credit provider 
of his rights, it is important that the arbitrariness test should be met when 
these remedies are granted. All factors must be considered and there must 
be a sufficient reason for the limitation imposed on the credit provider's 
rights, which means that there should be a satisfactory relationship between 
the purpose of the remedy (to discourage reckless credit and to relieve the 
consumer) and the effects on the credit provider. If the purpose and effect 
are out of proportion, the arbitrariness test might not be satisfied. 
As a rule of thumb, a reckless credit remedy should do no more than to 
rectify the prejudice suffered by the consumer due to the credit provider's 
conduct. One way to quantify the consumer's prejudice is the amount of the 
over-indebtedness that was caused by the reckless credit, but it can include 
other things like the impact on his dignity. The point is that the remedy 
should be tailored in such a way that the prejudice suffered by the consumer 
is removed. Anything more than that should be viewed with suspicion, 
otherwise the shift in patrimony from the credit provider to the consumer 
could be unjustified and unconstitutional. 
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